Hoagland v. Ada County Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 38775 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
4-27-2012
Hoagland v. Ada County Appellant's Reply Brief
Dckt. 38775
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Hoagland v. Ada County Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 38775" (2012). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 3623.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/3623
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
RITA HOAGLAND, individually, and in her 
capacity as Personal Representative of the 
ESTATE OF BRADLEY MUNROE, 
vs. 
Plaintiff-Appellant/ 
Cross-Respondent, 
ADA COUNTY, a political subdivision of the 
State ofIdaho; et ai., 
Defendants-Respondents/ 
Cross-Appellants. 
Supreme Court Docket No. 38775-2011 
Ada County Case No. CV-OC-2009-01461 
APPELLANT'S RESPONSE AND REPLY BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR ADA COUN1Y 
THE HONORABLE RONALD J. WILPER, DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING 
Darwin L. Overson, ISB #5887 
Eric B. Swartz, ISB #6396 
Joy M. Vega, ISB #7887 
JONES & SWARTZ PLLC 
1673 W. Shoreline Drive, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 7808 
Boise, ID 83707-7808 
Telephone: (208) 489-8989 
Facsimile: (208) 489-8988 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant! 
Cross-Respondent 
James K. Dickinson, ISB #2798 
Sherry A. Morgan, ISB #5296 
Ray 1. Chacko, ISB #5862 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorneys, Civil Division 
ADA COUN1Y PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
Facsimile: (208) 287-7719 
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents/ 
Cross-Appellants 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page No. 
r. ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................................ 1 
A. Whether as a Wrongful Death Claim, a Survivorship Claim, or Both, 
Mrs. Hoagland Has a Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ....................................................... 1 
1. This Court Must Follow the Analysis ofthe United States Supreme Court in 
Robertson v. Wegmann to Determine the Substantive Rule of Law to Apply 
in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Case .......................................................................................... 3 
2. Post-Robertson ............................................................................................................ 6 
3. Bradley's Claims Survive His Death ......................................................................... 10 
(a) Bradley's § 1983 Claim Did Not Abate Upon His Death ................................... 10 
4. Mrs. Hoagland May Maintain a § 1983 Action Under Idaho' s 
Wrongful Death Statute ............................................................................................. 11 
(a) Mrs. Hoagland's Loss of Society Damages Are Recoverable Under 
§ 1983 Pursuant to § 1988's Direction to Borrow the State's Wrongful 
Death Statute ........... , ........................................................................................... 11 
5. If This Court Reaches the Issue of Whether a Parent Has a Protected Right in 
the Relationship With an Adult Child, It Should Follow the Ninth Circuit's 
Cases Holding That Such a Right Exists ................................................................... 12 
6. An Intentional Interference With Familial Relations Should Not Be a 
Required Element Because Liability for Interference With Substantive 
Due Process Interests Has Always Hinged on Reckless Indifference, 
and Intent Has Never Been a Prerequisite ................................................................. 14 
B. The District Court Properly Exercised Its Discretion To Allow 
Additional Discovery ....................................................................................................... 15 
C. The Trial Court Did Not Err By Allowing Mrs. Hoagland to Amend Her 
Complaint to Assert Punitive Damages Against Ada County Defendants 
Sued in Their Individual Capacity ................................................................................... 17 
D. The District Court Did Not Err By Admitting and Considering Evidence 
Presented in Opposition to the Ada County Defendants' Motions for 
Summary Judgment ......................................................................................................... 20 
1. Standard of Review ................................................................................................... 21 
2. Defendants' First Motion to Strike - Filed July 1, 2010 ........................................... 23 
3. Defendants' Second Motion to Strike - Filed December 3, 2010 ............................. 24 
(a) Exhibit A ............................................................................................................. 25 
(b) Exhibits B-E ........................................................................................................ 26 
(c) Exhibit F .............................................................................................................. 28 
4. Defendants' Third Motion to Strike - Filed February 25,2011 ............................... 29 
5. Defendants' Fourth Motion to Strike - Filed March 4,2011 .................................... 34 
E. The Trial Court Incorrectly Viewed Mrs. Hoagland's Survivorship Claim as Being 
Brought by the Estate When, In Fact, It Was Brought by Mrs. Hoagland as an Heir, 
Which Gave Her Standing Under Idaho's Probate Code ................................................ 36 
F. The Law Was Sufficiently Established At the Time to Put the Ada County 
Defendants on Notice That Their Conduct Was In Violation of Bradley's 
Constitutional Rights ....................................................................................................... 37 
G. Kate Pape Was On Notice That By Not Enforcing Policies Designed to Ensure 
Mental Healthcare Delivery to Inmates, a Constitutional Violation Was Likely 
to Occur ........................................................................................................................... 43 
H. Mrs. Hoagland's Monell Claim Should Not Have Been Dismissed ............................... 44 
I. Costs and Fees ................................................................................................................. 45 
II. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................... 45 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ..................................................................................................... 46 
11 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES 
Page No. 
CASES 
Adams v. Pinole Point Steel Co., 
Nos. CV 92-1962 MHP, CV 93-3708 MHP, 1995 WL 73088 (N.D. Cal. Feb.10, 1995) ......... 18 
Adickes v. S. H Kress & Co., 398 US. 144 (1970) ...................................................................... 14 
Alexander Dawson, Inc. v. NLRB, 586 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1978) ................................................ 23 
Anderson v. Correctional Medical Services, 
Case No. CV 02-155-S-LMB, 2005 WL 3263896 (D. Idaho Nov. 18,2005) ............................. 8 
Badia v. City of Cas a Grande, 988 P.2d 134 (Ariz. App. 1999) .................................................. 18 
Ball v. City of Blackfoot, 2012 Idaho LEXIS 86, 10-11, *10-11 (Mar. 23, 2012) ........................ 21 
Banks v. Yokemich, 177 F. Supp. 2d 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ............................................................ 8 
Bass v. Wallenstein, 769 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1985) ........................................................................ 8 
Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (ih Cir. 1984) ................................................... 8, 13, 18 
Bird v. Figel, 725 F. Supp. 406 (N.D. Ind. 1989) ......................................................................... 18 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 US. 388 (1971) ....................................... 7 
Block v. City of Los Angeles, 253 F.3d 410 (9th Cir. 2001) .......................................................... 22 
Boncher v. Brown Cty., 272 F.3d 484 (ih Cir. 2001) ................................................................... 43 
Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464 (1985) .......................................................................................... 17 
Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 402, cert. denied, 368 US. 921 (1961) .............................................. 8 
Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (U.S. 2011) ......................................................................... 12 
Carlson v. Green, 446 US. 14 (1980) ................................................................................ 5,6, 7, 8 
Cates v. Albertson's, 126 Idaho 1030 (1995) ............................................................................... 21 
Cavalieri v. Shepard, 321 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2003) ................................................................ 39, 40 
Cerjan v. Fasula, 539 F. Supp. 1226 (N.D. Ohio 1981) ............................................................... 18 
Chacon v. Sperry Corp., 111 Idaho 270 (1986) ............................................................................ 22 
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. E.E. 0. c., 434 US. 412 (1978) .................................................. 45 
Clark v. Klein, 137 Idaho 154 (2002) .................................................................................... 32,33 
Community Hasp. v. Fail, 969 P.2d 667 (Colo. 1998) .................................................................. 18 
Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. New Images of Beverly Hills, 
60 Fed. Appx. 87, (9t Cir. 2003) ......................................................................................... 22, 27 
Crawford-EI v. Britton, 523 US. 574 (1998) ......................................................................... 15, 16 
Cuevas v. Barraza, 146 Idaho 511 (App. 2008) ........................................................................... 21 
Curnow v. Ridgecrest Police, 952 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1991) ........................................................... 1 
Cusack v. Idaho Dept. of Corrections, Case No. 1:11-CV-00303-REB, 
2012 US Dist. LEXIS 19948 (D. Idaho Feb. 15,2012) .................................................... 8,9, 11 
Davis v. City of Ellen burg, 651 F. Supp. 1248 (B.D. Wa. 1987) .................................................... 8 
Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867 (2006) ............................................................................. 32, 33 
111 
Edwards v. Alta Colleges, Inc., 
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3753, 16-18 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 28, 2005) .............................................. 27 
Estate o/Cole by Pardue v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254 (7th Cir. 1996) ................................................. 38 
Estate 0/ Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994) .................. 7 
Estate o/Terry Gee v. Bloomington Hospital, 2012 US. District LEXIS 29404, *8 .................... 3 
Evans v. Twin Falls County, 118 Idaho 210 ......................................................................... 7,8, 10 
Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988) ........................................................................................... 18 
Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F .3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2003) ........................................................................ 22 
Garcia v. Whitehead, 961 F. Supp. 230 (C.D. Cal. 1997) .............................................................. 8 
Garner v. Povey, 259 P.3d 608 (2011) ......................................................................................... 22 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 US. 574 (1982) ............................................................................ 15, 16 
Heath v. City o/Hialeah, 560 F. Supp. 840 (S.D. Fla. 1983) ......................................................... 8 
Hecla Mining Co. v. Star-Morning Mining Co., 122 Idaho 778 (1992) ....................................... 21 
Hegarty v. Somerset County, 848 F. Supp. 257 (D. Me. 1994), 
aff'd in part, 53 F .3d 1367 (1 st Cir. 1995) ................................................................................ 18 
Helgeson v. Powell, 54 Idaho 667 (1934) ..................................................................................... 10 
Hopkins v. Duo-Fast Corp., 123 Idaho 205 (1993) ................................................................ 32,33 
Horner v. Sani-Top, Inc., 143 Idaho 230 (2006) .......................................................................... 11 
Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5 (1980) .............................................................................................. 45 
Jaco v. Bloechle, 739 F.2d 239 (6th Cir. 1984) ............................................................................... 8 
Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995) ......................................................................................... 16 
Karnes v. SCI Colorado Funeral Services, 162 F.3d 1077 (1oth Cir. 1998) ................................. 18 
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 US. 159 (1985) ................................................................................... 17 
Larson v. Wind, 542 F. Supp. 25 (N.D. Ill. 1982) ........................................................................... 8 
Lorraine v. Markel American Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534 (D. MD 2007) ....................................... 22 
Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. App. 4th 212,92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 668 (Ct. App. 2000) ..... 18 
Lunders v. Estate o/Snyder, 131 Idaho 689 (1998) ...................................................................... 21 
McCann v. McCann, 2012 Idaho LEXIS 73, *34 ......................................................................... 16 
McCown v. City o/Fontana, 565 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2009) ......................................................... 45 
McDonald v. City o/Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) ................................................................. 13 
McFadden v. Sanchez, 710 F.2d 907 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 464 US. 961 (1983) ....................... 8 
McKinley v. Trattles, 732 F.2d 1320 (7th Cir. 1984) ..................................................................... 18 
McNeil v. Gisler, 100 Idaho 693 (1979) ....................................................................................... 21 
Miller v. Ririe Joint Sch. Dist. No. 252, 132 Idaho 385 (1999) .................................................... 45 
Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d 824 (ih Cir. 2010) ................................................................... 37,38 
Mitchellv. Forsyth, 472 US. 511 (1985) ..................................................................................... 16 
Mitchell v. Keith, 752 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1985) ............................................................................. 18 
Monell v. Dept. o/Social Services o/City o/New York, 436 US. 658 (1978) ................... 8, 44, 45 
Monroe v. Pape, 365 US 167 (1961) ............................................................................................ 14 
Nelson v. Emerald People's Uti!. Dist., 862 P.2d 1293 (Or. 1993) .............................................. 18 
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 US. 247 (1981) .................................................................. 17 
IV 
Norris v. City of Easton, 
Civ. A. No. 88-3028, 1989 WL 49520, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 8, 1989) ..................................... 18 
Orr v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2002) .................................................................. 23 
Ortizv. Jordan, 131 S. Ct. 884 (2011) .......................................................................................... 16 
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 US. 622 (1980) .............................................................. 16, 17 
Patrickv. City of Florala, 793 F. Supp. 301 (M.D. Ala. 1992) .................................................... 18 
Patrykus v. Gomilla, 
Nos. 86 C 9748, 87 C 2083, and 87 C 7925, 1989 WL 8610, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb.2, 1989) .... 18 
Perez v. Oakland County, 466 F.3d 416 (6th Cir. Mich. 2006) ............................................... 38, 39 
Pines Grazing Ass'n v. Flying Joseph Ranch, LLC, 265 P.3d 1136 (2011) .................................... 2 
Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho 161 (2007) ...................................................................................... 32 
Radmer v. Ford Motor Co., 120 Idaho 86 (1991) ................................................................... 32,33 
Read v. Teton Springs Golf & Casting Club, LLC, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134621,27-28 (D. Idaho Dec. 14,2010) ............................................ 27 
Rentz v. Spokane County, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (2006) ................................................................. 1 
Rhyne v. Henderson County, 973 F.2d 386 (5 th Cir. Tex. 1992) .................................................. 37 
Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978) ........................................................................ passim 
Rosa v. Cantrell, 705 F.2d 1208 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 US. 821 (1983) .................. 18 
Rowlett v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 832 F.2d 194 (1 st Cir. 1987) .................................................... 18 
Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783 (ih Cir. 2005) ........................................................................ 1, 11, 13 
Sager v. City of Woodland Park, 543 F. Supp. 282 (D. Colo. 1982) ........................................ 8, 18 
Sammis v. Magnetek, Inc., 130 Idaho 342 (1997) ......................................................................... 21 
Simmons v. Navajo County, 609 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. Ariz. 2010) ................................................. 39 
Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411 (9th Cir. Cal. 1987) ........................................... 11, 12, 13 
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983) ................................................................................... 14, 17, 19 
State v. Pickens, 148 Idaho 554 (App. 2010) ................................................................................ 25 
Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 259 (N.D. Cal. 1992) ............................................... 18 
Thompson v. Village of Hales Comers, 115 Wisc. 2d 289,340 N.W.2d 704 (1983) ................... 18 
Tracy v. Bittles, 820 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Ind. 1993) ....................................................................... 8 
Trujillo v. Bd. of County Comm 'rs, 768 F.2d 1186 (lOth Cir. 1985) .................................. 1, 12, 14 
Van Orden v. Caribou County, Case No. 4:10-CV-385-BLW, 
2011 US Dist. LEXIS 22778 (D. Idaho March 4, 2011) .................................................. 8, 9, 11 
White v. Talboys, 573 F. Supp. 49 (D. Colo. 1983) ........................................................................ 8 
Williams v. Oakland, 915 F. Supp. 1074 (N.D. Cal. 1996) ............................................................ 8 
Woods v. Graphic Communications, 925 F.2d 1195 (9th Cir. 1991) ............................................ 18 
Woodward v. CMS, 368 F.3d 917 (7th Cir. 2004) ............................................................. 41, 43, 44 
Woodward v. Myers I, 2001 US. Dist. LEXIS 6245 (N.D. Ill. May 14, 2001) ........................... 41 
Woodward v. Myers, 2002 US. Dist. LEXIS 23413 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 5,2002) .................. 41,42,43 
Wren v. Spurlock, 798 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir. 1986) ........................................................................ 18 
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) .................................................................................. 38 
v 
RULES 
F.R.C.P. 56 ........................................................................................................................ 15,22,23 
LR.C.P. 33 ..................................................................................................................................... 27 
LR.C.P. 56 .............................................................................................................................. passim 
LA.R. 40 ........................................................................................................................................ 45 
LA.R. 41 ........................................................................................................................................ 45 
LR.E. 103 ...................................................................................................................................... 21 
LR.E. 803 ...................................................................................................................................... 26 
LR.E. 804 ...................................................................................................................................... 26 
LR.E. 401 .......................................................................................................................... 23,25,30 
LR.E. 601 .......................................................................................................................... 23, 25, 30 
LR.E. 602 .......................................................................................................................... 23,25,30 
LR.E. 701 .......................................................................................................................... 23,25,30 
LR.E. 801 .......................................................................................................................... 23, 25, 30 
LR.E. 901 .............................................................................................................. 23, 25, 26, 27, 30 
LR.E. 902 ...................................................................................................................................... 27 
STATUTES 
United States Constitution, First Amendment .............................................................................. 13 
United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment .......................................................... 8, 11, 13 
United States Constitution, Art. VI, Clause 2 ............................................................................... 18 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 .................................................................................................................... passim 
42 U.S.C. § 1988 ................................................................................................................... 4,5,45 
Idaho Code § 5-311 ................................................................................................................... 1, 10 
Idaho Code § 6-903 ................................................................................................................. 17, 19 
Idaho Code § 12-107 ..................................................................................................................... 45 
Idaho Code § 12-121 ..................................................................................................................... 45 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
75 Am. Jur.2d (TRIALS) § 333, General Objections ..................................................................... 23 
FED. PRACT. & PROC., § 5036.7, ch. 2, Objections; Specificity-General Objections ................... 23 
McCormick On Evidence, Title 3, ch.6 § 52, Objections ............................................................. 23 
VI 
I. ARGUMENT 
A. \Vhether as a Wrongful Death Claim, a Survivorship Claim, or Both, 
Mrs. Hoagland Has a Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
The Ada County Defendants argue on cross-appeal that the trial court erred by not 
dismissing Count II of the Third Amended Complaint because a parent of an adult child has no 
constitutionally protected interest in her adult son's death. The cases cited by the Defendants to 
support that argument hold that the interest a parent has in the relationship is insufficient to 
justify due process protection. l Also cited by the Defendants are cases that hold a due process 
interest exists but unless an official's conduct is aimed at interfering with that interest, § 1983 
does not provide relief because the state actor did not act with deliberate indifference to the 
parent's relationship interest.2 According to the Defendants, only the Ninth Circuit holds that a 
parent has a protected due process interest in the relationship with an adult child.3 
The problem with the Defendants' position is that it fails to completely address the issue 
before this Court by ignoring the fact that Count II as pled is a § 1983 claim that incorporates 
Idaho's wrongful death statute, Idaho Code § 5-311, which gives her standing to assert the 
claims Bradley could have asserted had he survived.4 The issue as framed by the Defendants 
was not ruled on by the trial court. 5 The district court did not find that Mrs. Hoagland could 
proceed with Count II as a due process violation of her constitutional rights. The district court 
1 Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783 (ill Cir. 2005). 
2 Trujillo v. Ed. o/County Comm 'rs, 768 F.2d 1186 (lOth Cir. 1985). 
3 Rentz v. Spokane County, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (2006); see also Curnow v. Ridgecrest Police, 952 F.2d 
321 (9th Cir. 1991). 
4 See R. 1451-52, 1522 (Third Amended Complaint). 
5 See R. 1584-86. 
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found that Mrs. Hoagland could proceed under Count II as a wrongful death claim. As such, the 
issue raised by the Defendants' cross-appeal is not properly before this Court.6 
The issue actually before the Court is this: When an adult jail detainee's life is taken by 
deliberate indifference to the detainee's health and safety, must the detainee's parent bring the 
action as a wrongful death claim, a survivorship claim, or can it be brought as both? The 
Defendants only address whether a parent can bring the claim as one for violation of the parent's 
constitutional rights. While that question is important, it is not dispositive of the question of 
whether Mrs. Hoagland can proceed with Count II as a wrongful death claim under § 1983. 
Count I of the Complaint sought redress for the violation of Bradley's constitutional 
rights.7 Count II of the Complaint alleged that in addition to violating Bradley's constitutional 
rights, the Ada County Defendants violated Mrs. Hoagland's constitutional rights by terminating 
her due process familial interest in her relationship with Bradley.8 However, a liberal reading of 
both Count I and Count II show that they both include a wrongful death claim, and Count I 
includes a survivorship claim. The trial court dismissed the first count, but ruled that 
Mrs. Hoagland could proceed on the second count as a wrongful death claim under § 1983.9 
6 Pines Grazing Ass'n v. Flying Joseph Ranch, LLC, 265 P.3d 1136, 1143 (2011) (issues will not be 
addressed on appeal unless appellant can point to an adverse ruling). 
7 R. 1505-22. 
8 R. 1522-39. 
9 R. 1584-86. 
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1. This Court Must Follow the Analysis of the United States Supreme Court in 
Robertson V. Wegmann to Determine the Substantive Rule of Law to Apply 
in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Case 
Too often, the issues of whether the cause of action survives death and, if so, the nature 
of that claim, who can bring it, and what damages are available get muddled together in cases 
like this one. "Plainly stated, this area of the law is murky and confusing.,,10 To avoid the murk 
and confusion, it is important to first address the general framework set forth in Robertson v. 
Wegmann by the United States Supreme Court for determining the appropriate rule of law to 
apply in a § 1983 case when no federal rule exists. 
In Robertson v. Wegmann, the United States Supreme Court identified the proper analysis 
for selecting the appropriate rule oflaw to apply in a § 1983 case where no federal rules exists.ll 
There, the issue was whether a personal representative could continue a § 1983 claim after the 
plaintiff died of causes unrelated to the claim.l2 
The question presented is whether the District Court was required 
to adopt as federal law a Louisiana survivorship statute, which 
would have caused this action to abate, or was free instead to 
create a federal common-law rule allowing the action to survive. 
Resolution of this question turns on whether the state statute is 
"inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United 
States."l3 
Under Louisiana's survivorship statute, the personal representative was not permitted to be 
substituted as a plaintiff in a personal injury case. "[T]he action survives only in favor of a 
10 Estate o/Terry Gee v. Bloomington Hospital, 2012 U.S. District LEXIS 29404, *8. 
11 436 U.S. 584 (1978). 
12 Id. at 585. 
13 Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988). 
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spouse, children, parents, or siblings.,,14 The decedent in the case had no living spouse, child, 
parent or sibling. IS As such, the decedent's personal injury claims would have abated under state 
law. 16 The question then was whether Louisiana's survivorship law was applicable in the 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 case by application of 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 17 
The controlling provision of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 provides as follows: 
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the 
district courts by the provisions of this chapter and Title 18, for the 
protection of all persons in the United States in their civil rights, 
and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in 
conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws 
are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where 
they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions 
necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against 
law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution 
and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of 
such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not 
inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, 
shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and 
disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the 
infliction of punishment on the party found guilty. 18 
The statute recognizes that federal law does not '''cover every issue that may arise in the context 
of a federal civil rights action. '" 19 
14 1d. at 59l. 
15 !d. at 591-92. 
161d. 
17 1d. 
When federal law is thus "deficient," § 1988 instructs us to tum to 
"the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and 
statutes of the [forum] State," as long as these are "not inconsistent 
with the Constitution and laws of the United States." Regardless 
of the source of the law applied in a particular case, however, it is 
18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
19 Robertson, 436 U.S. at 588 (quoting Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 703, 702 (1973)). 
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clear that the ultimate rule adopted under § 1988 '" is a federal rule 
responsive to the need whenever a federal right is impaired. ",20 
Thus, to apply 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the analysis requires a court to first determine whether the 
federal law is deficient in furnishing a particular rule.21 Survival of a civil rights action under 
§ 1983 was one area not covered by federal law at the time Robertson was decided.22 
Having found that the federal law was deficient, the Robertson Court then looked to state 
law and found a suitable rule in Louisiana's survivorship statute.23 
The next step in the analysis was to determine whether the state rule was inconsistent 
with the federal statutes and constitutional provisions.24 In doing so, the Court instructed lower 
courts to look to the policies expressed in the statutes and constitutional provisions:25 
Of particular importance is whether application of state law 
"would be inconsistent with the federal policy underlying the cause 
of action under consideration." The instant cause of action arises 
under 42 V.S.c. § 1983, one of the "Reconstruction civil rights 
statutes" that this Court has accorded "'a sweep as broad as [their] 
language. ",26 
In applying these principles, the Court found that Louisiana's survivorship law was not 
inconsistent with the policies expressed in § 1983, i.e. deterrence and compensation.27 The Court 
20 [d. (quoting Moor, 411 U.S. at 703, in turn quoting Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, [nc., 396 U.S. 229, 
240 (1969)). 
21 [d. 
22 [d. at 589. 
23 !d. at 590. 
24Id. at 589-90. 
25 Id. at 590. 
26 Id. at 590 (quoting Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 465 (1975); Griffin v. 
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88,97 (1971); and Us. v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966)). 
27 Id.; see Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 24 (1980) (two policies advanced by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are 
compensation for constitutional violations and deterrence 0 f future violations). 
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explained abatement in the particular case was not inconsistent with the purpose of § 1983 since 
most actions survived the plaintiff's death under the state statute due to most people having "one 
of these close relatives. ,,28 
In reaching its conclusion, the Court emphasized that its holding was a narrow one: 
Our holding today is a narrow one, limited to situations in which 
no claim is made that state law generally is inhospitable to survival 
of § 1983 actions and in which the particular application of state 
survivorship law, while it may cause abatement of the action, has 
no independent adverse effect on the policies underlying § 1983. 
A different situation might well be presented, as the District Court 
noted, if state law "did not provide for survival of any tort actions," 
or if it significantly restricted the types of actions that survive. We 
intimate no view, moreover, about whether abatement based on 
state law could be allowed in a situation in which deprivation of 
federal rights caused death. 
Here it is agreed that Shaw's death was not caused by the 
deprivation of rights for which he sued under § 1983, and 
Louisiana law provides for the survival of most tort actions. 
Respondent's only complaint about Louisiana law is that it would 
cause Shaw's action to abate. We conclude that the mere fact of 
abatement of a particular lawsuit is not sufficient ground to declare 
state law "inconsistent" with federallaw. 29 
Where the state law is inconsistent with the purposes of § 1983, the court is then "to 
create a federal common-law rule" that is consistent with § 1983's policies.3o 
2. Post-Robertson 
After Robertson, federal common law developed to clarify that § 1983 claims survive 
lethal misconduct. In Carlson v. Green, the United States Supreme Court held that federal law 
28 [d. at 591. It should be clear that had a qualified person existed the claim would have survived. 
29 Id. at 594-95. 
30 !d. at 585. 
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supplied the controlling rule of survivorship in a Biven/1 case where federal prison officials 
were sued for causing the decedent's death by being deliberately indifferent to the inmate's 
medical needs.32 The Court observed: 
Bivens actions are a creation of federal law and, therefore, the 
question whether respondent's action survived Jones' death is a 
question of federal law. Whatever difficulty we might have 
resolving the question were the federal involvement less clear, we 
hold that only a uniform federal rule of survivorship will suffice to 
redress the constitutional deprivation here alleged and to protect 
against repetition of such conduct. 33 
Following Robertson and Carlson, the Ninth Circuit, in Estate of Ferdinand Jl1arcos, Human 
Rights Litigation, held that personal injury and wrongful death claims arising out of official 
torture brought under international law survived the victim's death.34 
This Court held in Evans v. Twin Falls County, that the plaintiffs § 1983 claim for 
Fourth Amendment violations abated upon death where she died of causes unrelated to the 
constitutional violation.35 However, like Robertson, Evans did not address the issue of 
abatement of claims arising out of the victim's death. Had that issue been before this Court, the 
outcome would have been different because a state rule that abates all claims upon the death 
irrespective of the cause of death would result in under-enforcement of the constitutional rights. 
31 446 U.S. 14,24 (1980). Bivens actions provide a remedy and deterrent where a federal official violated 
constitutional rights. Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971). 
Though § 1983 only applies to state actors, Bivens provides an "equally effective" remedy against federal 
officials' misconduct as is provided under § 1983. [d. 
32 446 U.S. 14, 14 (1980). 
33 Id. at 23. 
34 25 F.3d 1467, 1476 (9th Cir. 1994). 
35 118 Idaho 210, 217-18 (1990). 
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And since the overarching purpose of § 1983 is "to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth 
amendment to the Constitution of the United States,,,36 a state law that results in under-
enforcement of federal rights is by definition inconsistent with federal law.37 This is precisely 
why many courts have recognized a federal survivorship rule where state law would otherwise 
have abated claims arising out of the death of the victim.38 
Numerous federal courts have followed Robertson and Carlson to conclude that when a 
federal-rights deprivation results in death, state laws that abate § 1983 claims or limit the 
recoverable damages are inconsistent with § 1983's purpose and should not be applied.39 
Among the federal cases that have reached that result are two out of the District of Idaho. Chief 
Judge Winmill of the United States District Court for the District of Idaho decided in Van Orden 
v. Caribou County, that in a § 1983 case where the wrong caused the victim's death, Idaho's 
36 Alonell v. Dept. of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 665 (1978) (quoting 
Representative Shellabarger who, acting for a House select committee, reported on bill, H.R. 320 § 1 on 
March 28, 1871, which soon thereafter passed both houses to be enacted as § 1983). 
37 Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 24 (1980). See also Cusack v. Idaho Dept. of Corrections, Case 
No. 1:11-CV-303-REB, 2012 US Dist. LEXIS 19948 (D. Idaho Feb. 15, 2012) (holding Idaho's 
abrogation rules inconsistent with federal law in § 983 case where victim died of the constitutional 
violation alleged); Van Orden v. Caribou County, Case No. 4:10-CV-385-BLW, 2011 US Dist. LEXIS 
22778 (D. Idaho March 4, 2011) (same); but see Anderson v. Correctional Medical Services, Case 
No. CV 02-155-S-LMB, 2005 WL 3263896 (D. Idaho Nov. 18, 2005) (applying Evans to dismiss claim 
upon death of plaintiff allegedly caused by constitutional violation). 
38 Bass v. Wallenstein, 769 F.2d 1173 (ih Cir. 1985); Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1234-41 
(7th Cir. 1984); Jaco v. Bloechle, 739 F.2d 239 (6 th Cir. 1984); Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 402, cert. 
denied, 368 U.S. 921 (1961); McFadden v. Sanchez, 710 F.2d 907 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961 
(1983); Banks v. Yokemich, 177 F. Supp. 2d 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Garcia v. Whitehead, 961 F. Supp. 230 
(C.D. Cal. 1997); Williams v. Oakland, 915 F. Supp. 1074 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Tracy v. Biules, 820 F. Supp. 
396 (N.D. Ind. 1993); Davis v. City of Ellenburg, 651 F. Supp. 1248 (E.D. Wa. 1987); Heath v. City of 
Hialeah, 560 F. Supp. 840 (S.D. Fla. 1983); White v. Talboys, 573 F. Supp. 49 (D. Colo. 1983); Sager v. 
City of Woodland Park, 543 F. Supp. 282, 297 (D. Colo. 1982); Larson v. Wind, 542 F. Supp. 25, 27 
(N.D. Ill. 1982). 
39 See supra, note 39. 
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abatement rule cannot apply without interfering with the policy reasons that § 1983 was enacted 
to serve.40 Following Van Orden, United States District Court, District of Idaho Magistrate 
Judge Bush recently ruled in a jail suicide case brought under § 1983, that Idaho's abatement 
rule was inconsistent with federal law.41 After Judge Bush reached that conclusion, he 
concluded that under Robertson the court "was free to create a federal common-law rule 
allowing the action to survive.,,42 
The reason that a blanket non-survivability rule has no application in a § 1983 case where 
official illegality causes death is that the policies of § 1983 would be severely undermined. As 
opposed to the situation in Robertson where one plaintiffs claim abated solely because he did 
not have a surviving spouse, child, parent or sibling, application of Idaho's abatement rule 
nullifies an entire class of cases where death resulted from a constitutional violation. 
Applying the Robertson Court's analysis and its principles to the case at hand, it is clear 
that (1) Bradley's constitutional claims under § 1983 survive; (2) Mrs. Hoagland has standing to 
assert those claims; and (3) if Mrs. Hoagland proves liability and causation, she is entitled to 
damages, and those would include compensatory and punitive damages. 
40 Case No. 4:10-CV-385-BLW 2011 US Oist. LEXIS 22778 (D. [daho March 4,2011). 
41 Cusackv. Idaho Dept. a/Corrections, Case No. 1:11-CV-00303-REB, 2012 US Oist. LEXIS 19948 (D. 
Idaho Feb. 15,2012). 
42 !d. (quoting Robertson, 436 U.S. at 585). 
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3. Bradley's Claims Survive His Death 
(a) Bradley's § 1983 Claim Did Not Abate Upon His Death 
Bradley's § 1983 claims did not abate upon his death because the Ada County 
Defendants' unconstitutional acts caused his death. Defendants rely heavily on Evans v. Twin 
Falls43 to support their argument that Count I was properly dismissed.44 However, that reliance 
is misplaced. Before the Evans Court addressed the abatement issue, it was careful to first 
determine whether the plaintiffs death was caused by the constitutional violations that form the 
basis of the claim.45 Then again, in its analysis of whether the claim survived, this Court 
reiterated the fact that there was no evidence that her death was caused by the wrongs alleged in 
the complaint.46 The Court would not have had to reach the issue of the cause of Mrs. Evans' 
death if Idaho's abatement rule applied in all § 1983 cases irrespective of the cause of death. 
Defendants' argument that abatement of claims upon death is the rule in Idaho, even in 
§ 1983 cases where death is caused by a constitutional violation, fails for several succinct 
reasons. First, the common law has been modified in Idaho by the adoption of I.e. § 5-311 
(wrongful death) which permits certain relations to sue for the claims the decedent would have 
had, had he not died.47 Second, even if the Defendants were correct, this Court would have to 
43 118 Idaho 210 (1990). 
44 Respondents' Brief, pp. 13-17. 
45 Evans, 118 Idaho at 213-14. 
46 [d. at 218. 
47 Helgeson v. Powell, 54 Idaho 667, 676-78 (1934). A wrongful death claim survives the decedent in the 
sense that a new claim arises in favor of the heirs and personal representative at the time of the decedent's 
death which is identical to the claim the decedent would have had but for his death. !d. [daho's wrongful 
death statute alters the common law rule that personal injuries abate upon death of the person injured. [d. 
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find that the state law is inconsistent with § 1983' s purpose of enforcing the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. Third, there is a federal common law rule of 
survivorship that has developed since Robertson.48 As such, this Court need not reach the § 1988 
analysis set forth in Robertson for determining whether to incorporate a state rule where there is 
an absence of federal law on the subject. Finally, even if a federal common law survivorship had 
not developed, the final step in the Robertson analysis requires this Court to fashion a suitable 
rule that advances the purposes of § 1983 because state law is inconsistent with those purposes.49 
4. Mrs. Hoagland May Maintain a § 1983 Action Under Idaho's 
Wrongful Death Statute 
(a) Mrs. Hoagland's Loss of Society Damages Are Recoverable Under § 1983 
Pursuant to § 1988's Direction to Borrow the State's Wrongful Death Statute 
This Court does not have to decide whether to recognize the type of a constitutionally 
protected due process right in the relationship between a parent and an adult child that the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized50 and that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has 
refused to recognize. 51 Nor does it have to decide whether to adopt the Tenth Circuit Court of 
See also Horner v. San i-Top, Inc., 143 Idaho 230, (2006) (holding sufficient evidence of father's 
emotional distress stemming from child's death existed to justify an award of damages). 
48 See supra, § I.A.2. 
49 See Van Orden v. Caribou County, Case No.4: 1 O-CV -385-BL W 2011 US Dist. LEXIS 22778 (D. 
Idaho March 4, 2011); Cusack v. Idaho Dept. of Corrections, Case No.1: ll-CV -00303-REB, 2012 US 
Dist. LEXIS 19948 (D. Idaho Feb. 15,2012). 
50 See Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1419 (9th Cir. Cal. 1987) (holding adult children's liberty 
interest in relationship with parent protected by substantive due process and state interference supports a 
§ 1983 claim). 
51 See Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783 (ill Cir. 2005) (holding parent has insufficient interest in relationship 
with adult child to be protected by the due process clause). 
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Appeals' approach that recognizes a protected familial interest but requires an intentional state 
interference for the parent to recover. 52 
Generally, judicial restraint requires courts to avoid reaching constitutional questions 
where there is no necessity that the question be resolved. 53 Here, the constitutional question of 
whether a parent has protected due process rights in a relationship with an adult child need not be 
reached by this Court. Whether the trial court was correct in denying the Ada County 
Defendants' motion to dismiss Count II can be resolved by affirming the trial court's conclusion 
that Mrs. Hoagland may pursue her § 1983 case based on the borrowing of Idaho's wrongful 
death statute because she is an heir and the personal representative of Bradley's estate. 
5. If This Court Reaches the Issue of Whether a Parent Has a Protected Right in 
the Relationship With an Adult Child, It Should Follow the Ninth Circuit's 
Cases Holding That Such a Right Exists 
Despite being in the minority, the Ninth Circuit's decisions recognizing a parent's due 
process right in the relationship with an adult child is the better reasoned approach and is more 
consistent with the original intent of § 1983. The Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Smith v. City of 
Fontana is compelling: 
Our conclusion also finds compelling support in the legislative 
history of section 1983' s precursor, the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871. 
Representative Butler described the Act "as a remedy for wrongs, 
arsons, and murders done. This is what we offer to a man whose 
house has been burned, as a remedy; to the woman whose husband 
has been murdered, as a remedy; to the children whose father has 
been killed, as a remedy." CONGo GLOBE, 42D CONG., 1ST SESS. 
807 (1871 ) (emphasis added). Indeed, the "legislative history 
52 See Trujillo V. Ed. Of County Comm'rs, 768 F.2d 1186 (loth Cir. 1985) (interference with familial 
relations will support a § 1983 due process claim where interference was intentional). 
53 Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2031 (U.S. 2011). 
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makes a clearer case for recovery to the child due to loss of support 
or loss of society and companionship of a parent ... [than for] the 
parent's rights [for recovery] vis-a-vis the loss of a child:' Bell, 
746 F.2d at 1244 (emphasis added). Both case law and legislative 
history thus lead us to the conclusion that Mr. Smith's adult and 
minor children had a cognizable liberty interest in their 
relationship with their father. 54 
The Ninth Circuit's approach also protects First Amendment rights of association that are 
incorporated by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.55 While not all associations should be extended constitutional protection, familial 
association has long been understood as fundamental. The recognition that no parent should 
outlive a child captures part of the importance that has been attributed to such relationships. 
That most states include a parent as a person who may bring a wrongful death claim for the death 
of an adult child also speaks to the importance such relationships have in our society. 
The courts that have rejected the Ninth Circuit's approach have done so on a false 
premise. For instance, in Russ v. Watts, a case cited by the Defendants, the court expressed a 
concern that to permit a parent to assert a claim under the Due Process clause for loss of familial 
relations with an adult child creates a problem where there may be no outer limit to demark 
which relationships will be protected and which will not.56 While the United States Supreme 
Court has not directly addressed the issue, the framework set forth by the Court in Robertson 
strongly suggests that those Circuits that have rejected recognizing a due process interest in such 
relationships because ofthat fear are solving a problem that does not exist. Under Robertson, the 
54 Smith v. City 0/ Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1419 (9th Cir. Cal. 1987). 
55 McDonald v. City o/Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3034-3035 (2010). 
56 414 F.3d 783, 789 (ih Cir. 2005). 
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Court provided the correct analysis for determining which relationships should and should not be 
recognized, i.e., the states' wrongful death and survivorship statutes, state constitutions, and the 
common law. 57 
For these reasons, the Ninth Circuit's approach is the better one. 
6. An Intentional Interference With Familial Relations Should Not Be a Required 
Element Because Liability for Interference With Substantive Due Process 
Interests Has Always Hinged on Reckless Indifference, and Intent Has Never 
Been a Prerequisite 
In addition, should this Court require a showing that the state official's conduct was 
aimed at interfering with the relationship, to be consistent with the United States Supreme 
Court's due process cases, this Court should hold that deliberate indifference toward the 
relationship is the required element of the claim. The Tenth Circuit's holding in Trujillo v. Bd. of 
County Comm'rs interjected a requirement that the state actor had to intentionally interfere with 
the familial relationship.58 However, the United States Supreme Court held in Monroe v. Pape 
that no specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right is necessary to create liability under 
§ 1983.59 In Smith v. Wade, the United States Supreme Court went further and held that a 
showing of reckless indifference to the constitutionally protected rights of others is sufficient for 
an award of punitive damages.6o To the best of counsel's knowledge, the United States Supreme 
Court has never held that liability for a substantive due process violation requires intentional 
57 436 U.S. at 585-92. 
58 768 F.2d at 1190. 
59 365 US 167, 187 (1961); see also Adickes v. S. H Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 161 (1970) (knowledge 
must be shown). 
60 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). 
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conduct. In this respect, the Tenth Circuit is far afield of the teachings of the United States 
Supreme Court. 
This Court should instead hold that deliberate indifference to the protected due process 
right in familial relations is sufficient. Here, Mrs. Hoagland has shown that Mr. Johnson was 
aware that Bradley had a mother who cared enough for him to call the jail to ensure his safety. 
Despite his knowledge that Bradley was at risk of suicide, he showed a deliberate indifference to 
Bradley's right to safety and care, and the relationship interest Mrs. Hoagland had in her son. 
While this Court need not reach the constitutional question pressed by the Defendants in 
their cross-appeal, if the Court does find a constitutionally protected familial interest, it should 
hold that deliberate indifference to the adult child's rights is sufficient. However, if the Court 
finds that the state actor's conduct must be aimed at the familial relationship, it should hold that 
deliberate indifference toward the relationship is sufficient to establish liability under § 1983. 
B. The District Court Properly Exercised Its Discretion To Allow Additional Discovery 
The Ada County Defendants argue that whenever qualified immunity is raised, all 
discovery must stop. However, the United States Supreme Court has said that the "judge does, 
however, have discretion to postpone ruling on a defendant's summary judgment motion if the 
plaintiff needs additional discovery to explore . facts essential to justify the party's 
opposition.' ,,61 
Discovery involving public officials is indeed one of the evils that 
Harlow62aimed to address, but neither that opinion nor subsequent 
61 Crawford-EI v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600 n. 20 (1998) (citing F.R.C.P 56(f)). 
62 Referring to Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 574 (1982). 
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decisions create an immunity from all discovery. Harlow sought 
to protect officials from the costs of "broad-reaching" discovery, 
and we have since recognized that limited discovery may 
sometimes be necessary before the district court can resolve a 
motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.63 
Since a trial court has discretion to postpone ruling on a defendant's summary judgment motion 
to let the plaintiff conduct discovery, the trial court's decision in this case would be reviewed by 
this Court under an abuse of discretion standard.64 
Here, the trial court granted Mrs. Hoagland's LR.C.P. 56(f) motion because factual issues 
genuinely in dispute precluded summary adjudication at that time.65 Where the law is clearly 
established but genuine issues of material fact exist, a trial court cannot make a determination on 
the defense of qualified immunity. 66 
Additionally, even if some of the Ada County Defendants sued in their individual 
capacities were entitled to qualified immunity, the municipality was not entitled to qualified 
immunity, and thus, discovery would have continued on those claims. In Owen v. City of 
Independence, the United Supreme Court held that qualified immunity is not a defense for 
63 Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 593 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646, n. 6 (1987); see also 
lvlitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). 
64 See McCann v. McCann, 2012 Idaho LEXIS 73, *34 ("Control of discovery is within the discretion of 
the trial court."); see also I.R.C.P. 56(f). 
65 Trans. (7/8/10) 10:1-17:17,25:5-37:22,41:19-75:25, 76:1-92:3,84:5-95:6. 
66 See Ortiz v. Jordan, 131 S. Ct. 884, 891-892 (2011) (where issues of fact exist an immediate appeal is 
not available from a denial of a motion for summary judgment based on a qualified immunity defense); 
Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313-318 (1995) (a trial may be necessary to resolve qualified immunity 
issues where the facts are in dispute). 
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municipalities to § 1983 liability.67 As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion In 
allowing discovery to continue. 
Finally, it should be noted that when the trial court heard Defendants' motion for 
discovery protection, the trial court had before it Mrs. Hoagland's motion for leave to file an 
amended complaint, which it granted.68 The amended complaint specifically set forth the factual 
basis for the claims.69 Based on the then-proposed amended complaint and affidavits before the 
trial court, it was clear that factual issues existed that required additional discovery to resolve 
before the trial court could rule on the qualified immunity issues.7o As such, the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion by denying the Ada County Defendants' motion for discovery protection. 
C. The Trial Court Did Not Err By Allowing Mrs. Hoagland to Amend Her Complaint 
to Assert Punitive Damages Against Ada County Defendants Sued in Their 
Individual Capacity 
The Ada County Defendants argue that because those Defendants sued in their individual 
capacity will be indemnified by the County pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-903(b), the trial court 
erred when it granted leave to amend the complaint to include punitive damages. However, as a 
matter of federal law, a § 1983 plaintiff may seek punitive damages for the conduct of an 
individual acting under the color of state law that amounts to deliberate indifference. 71 The 
legislative decision to indemnify government officials does not change the federal law. 
67 445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980); see also Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 472-473 (1985) (same). 
68 Trans. (7/8/10) 84:5-95:6. 
69 See R. 1451-1540. 
70 See Trans. (7/8110) 84:5-95:6. 
71 Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983); Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981); 
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.l3 (1985). 
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Repeatedly, courts have recognized that compensatory damages alone are unlikely to 
serve § 1983's deterrent purpose and that punitive damages are necessary to fully enforce 
constitutionally protected rightS.72 Often, as is the case here, the compensatory damages are 
likely to be relatively small. For this Court to rule that punitive damages are not available 
against individual capacity Defendants merely because Ada County would foot the bill would 
significantly frustrate the purpose of § 1983 and would be contrary to federal law. The final 
result would create an insurmountable Supremacy Clause problem for the statute.73 
72 Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 140-41, 144 (1988) (quoting Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 269 
(l985)); Badia v. City o/Casa Grande, 988 P.2d 134, 141 (Ariz. App. 1999); Bell v. City o/Milwaukee, 
746 F.2d 1205, 1251-53 (7th Cir. 1984); Rosa v. Cantrell, 705 F.2d 1208 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 
464 U.S. 821 (1983); Hegarty v. Somerset County, 848 F. Supp. 257 (D. Me. 1994), a!J'd in part, 53 F.3d 
1367 (1 st Cir. 1995); Patrick v. City 0/ Florala, 793 F. Supp. 301 (M.D. Ala. 1992); Sager v. City 0/ 
Woodland Park, 543 F. Supp. 282 (D. Colo. 1982); Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. App. 4th 212, 
92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 668 (Ct. App. 2000); Thompson v. Village 0/ Hales Comers, 115 Wisc. 2d 289, 340 
N.W.2d 704 (1983); see Karnes v. SCI Colorado Funeral Services, 162 F.3d 1077, 1080 (loth Cir. 1998) 
(finding federal law supplies a suitable rule to apply for the burden of proof required to award punitive 
damages). See, Nelson v. Emerald People's Util. Dist., 862 P.2d 1293, 1300 (Or. 1993) (the federal 
standard of proof for punitive damages under § 1983 is a preponderance of the evidence); Community 
Hosp. v. Fail, 969 P.2d 667, 681 (Colo. 1998) (in federal civil rights cases burden of proof for punitive 
damages is preponderance of the evidence irrespective of state statute setting standard to beyond a 
reasonable doubt); Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 259, 324 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (same); Adams 
v. Pinole Point Steel Co., Nos. CV 92-1962 MHP, CV 93-3708 MHP, 1995 WL 73088, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 
Feb.lO, 1995) (same); Bird v. Figel, 725 F. Supp. 406, 412 (N.D. Ind. 1989) (same); Patrykus v. Gomilla, 
Nos. 86 C 9748, 87 C 2083, and 87 C 7925, 1989 WL 8610, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb.2, 1989) (same) (citing 
Spanish Action Comm. o/Chicago v. City o/Chicago, 766 F.2d 315,318 n. 2 (ih Cir. 1985); Norris v. 
City 0/ Easton, Civ. A. No. 88-3028, 1989 WL 49520, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 8, 1989) (same); Rowlett v. 
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 832 F.2d 194, 205 n. 5 (lst Cir. 1987) (same); Wren v. Spurlock, 798 F.2d 1313, 
1322 (10th Cir. 1986) (same); McKinley v. Trattles, 732 F.2d 1320, 1326 n. 2 (ih Cir. 1984) (same); 
Cerjan v. Fasula, 539 F. Supp. 1226, 1235 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (same). Compare, Mitchell v. Keith, 752 
F.2d 385, 390 (9th Cir. 1985) (applying California law to set standard for punitive damages) with Woods 
v. Graphic Communications, 925 F.2d 1195, 1204-06 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying federal law to set punitive 
damages standard and discussing supremacy of federal law permitting recovery of punitive damages 
against state actors under § 1983 over statutory immunity from punitive damages). 
73 See United States Constitution, Art. VI, Clause 2; Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. at 140-41, 150-51. 
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Even in light of Idaho Code § 6-903(b), punitive damages serve the purpose of deterrence 
because they still punish the individual defendant involved. Once a county employee is found to 
have acted deliberately indifferent to another's constitutional rights, and thereby exposed the 
employer to a punitive damage award, that employee's prospects in the job market will be 
negatively impacted. A punitive damage award economically impacts a defendant found guilty 
of deliberate indifIerence to the constitutional rights of others even when indemnification rights 
are statutorily available. 
The State of Idaho simply cannot immunize government officials sued in their individual 
capacity from punitive damages merely by enacting an indemnification statute that shields 
officials from the full impact intended by § 1983 as a consequence for deliberate indifference 
toward the constitutional rights of its citizens. 
Ada County Defendants also argue that even if this Court holds punitive damages are 
available in a § 1983 case against officials sued in their individual capacity, this Court should 
find that Mrs. Hoagland has not proven a sufficiently evil intent to justify an award of punitive 
damages in this case. However, the United States Supreme Court, in Smith v. Wade, settled this 
issue long ago. In Smith, the Court held that where § 1983 liability hinges on proof of deliberate 
indifference, such proof is sufficient to support an award of punitive damages. 74 The defendants 
in Smith argued for a higher mental state requirement such as "intentional" but that argument 
. d 75 was reJecte . 
74 461 U.S. at 56. 
75 !d. 
Since Mrs. Hoagland included factual allegations amounting to deliberate 
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indifference toward the constitutional rights of Bradley,76 she has pled the requisite mental state 
for punitive damages to be awarded. 
The trial court did not err when it granted Mrs. Hoagland leave to amend her complaint to 
add a claim for punitive damages. 
D. The District Court Did Not Err By Admitting and Considering Evidence Presented 
in Opposition to the Ada County Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment 
The Ada County Defendants filed numerous motions to strike. The first was filed on 
July 1, 2010, and sought "an Order striking portions of the Plaintiffs Summary Judgment 
filings.,·77 The second was filed on December 3,2010, and sought "an Order striking portions of 
the Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiff s Opposition to Defendants' Restated Motion for 
Summary Judgment.,,78 The third was filed on February 25,2011, and sought "an Order striking 
portions of the Plaintiffs Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiffs Motion For 
Reconsideration ... and the Opinion and New Opinion of Dr. White.,,79 In each instance the 
trial court granted in part and denied in part the Ada County Defendants' motions to strike. 80 
76 R. 1451-1540. The individual Ada County Defendants invite this Court to resolve on appeal genuine 
issues of material fact as to whether they had the necessary mental state to support an award of punitive 
damages. The invitation should be declined as that is an issue for the jury. 
77 R. 914-15. 
78 R. 2246-47. 
79 R. 3250-5l. 
80 R. 2315-17, 3486-93. The trial court's August 16, 2010 order on Defendants' first motion to strike is 
not part of the record on appeal. But see Trans. (7/8/10) 94:5-65:6. 
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1. Standard of Review 
"When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a summary judgment motion, this Court will 
consider only proof that complies with Rule 56(e), being based upon personal knowledge and 
containing material that would be admissible at trial."SI 
The right to challenge on appeal the consideration of evidence at the summary judgment 
stage must be preserved by some form of an objection.82 This Court will not consider the 
sufficiency of an affidavit where the issue was never raised with the trial court.83 Where no 
objection is made to evidence submitted to the trial court, the evidence can be considered.84 
Under Rule l03(a)(1) of the Idaho Rules of Evidence, a specific objection is required if the 
grounds are not apparent from the context. 85 "In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a 
timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if 
the specific ground was not apparent from the context."S6 If a proper objection is raised, the 
admissibility question must be resolved before the trial court addresses the merits of motions for 
summary judgment.87 A trial court's failure to rule on a motion to strike amounts to a denial of 
the motion. 88 
81 Cates v. Albertson's, 126 Idaho 1030, 1033-1034 (1995). 
82 Hecla Mining Co. v. Star-Morning Mining Co., 122 Idaho 778, 785 (1992). 
83 Sammis v. Magnetek, Inc., 130 Idaho 342, 349-351 (1997). 
84 McNeil v. Gisler, 100 Idaho 693, 696-697 (1979); Cuevas v. Barraza, 146 Idaho 511, 515 (App. 2008). 
85 Lunders v. Estate 0/ Snyder, 131 Idaho 689 (1998). 
86 LR.E. 103(a)(1). 
87 Ball v. City a/Black/oat, 2012 Idaho LEXIS 86, 10-11, *10-11 (Mar. 23, 2012). 
88 Id. at *11. 
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The determination of relevancy is reviewed by this Court de novo. 89 The "decision to 
admit relevant evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.9o 
Evidence submitted at the summary judgment stage need not be in a form that would be 
admissible. Idaho courts have not addressed this specific issue, but federal courts have, and 
Idaho's Rule 56 is identical to the federal rule.91 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held 
that '·to survive summary judgment, a party does not necessarily have to produce evidence in a 
form that would be admissible at trial, as long as the party satisfies the requirements of Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure 56.,,92 "At the summary judgment stage, we do not focus on the 
admissibility of the evidence's form. We instead focus on the admissibility of its contents.,,93 
Documents produced in discovery by a party are deemed authentic where the producing 
party does not challenge their authenticity.94 Additionally, attaching documents produced in 
discovery to an affidavit stating as much is sufficient to authenticate such documents: 
[Rule] 56(e) does not require that all documents be authenticated 
through personal knowledge when submitted in a summary 
judgment motion. Such a requirement is limited to situations 
where exhibits are introduced by being attached to an affidavit. 
89 Garner v. Pavey, 259 P.3d 608,613 (2011). 
90 Id. 
91 Chacon v. Sperry Corp., 111 Idaho 270, 272 (1986) (discussion ofIdaho adopting the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure). 
92 Block v. City of Los Angeles, 253 F.3d 410, 418-19 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Fraser v. Goodale, 342 
F.3d 1032, 1036-37 (9th Cir. 2003) ("even if the diary itself may be inadmissible" its content was 
admissible because it was merely "recitations of events within Fraser's personal knowledge and, 
depending on the circumstances, could be admitted into evidence at trial in a variety of ways"). See 
Lorraine v. Markel American Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534 (D. MD 2007), for a comprehensive discussion of 
the necessary foundation for admitting electronically stored information in the context of motions for 
summary judgment. 
93 Fraser, 342 F.3d at 1036-17. 
94 Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. New Images of Beverly Hills, 60 Fed. Appx. 87, *4 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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Compare Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) (bearing the heading "Form of 
Affidavits") with Fed.R.Evid. 901(b) (providing ten methods to 
authenticate evidence). For instance, documents attached to an 
exhibit list in a summary judgment motion could be authenticated 
by review of their contents if they appear to be sufficiently 
genuine. See Fed.R.Evid. 901(b)(4) (authenticity may be satisfied 
by the "[a ]ppearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or 
other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with 
circumstances. "); United States v. Whitworth, 856 F .2d 1268, 1283 
(9th Cir. 1988) (authenticating letters by the linkage between the 
dates of postmarks and defendant's location on the days letters 
mailed); United States v. One 56-Foot Motor Yacht Named 
Tahuna, 702 F.2d 1276, 1284-85 (9th Cir. 1983) (authenticating a 
diary under Rule 901(b)(4) by reviewing its contents); Alexander 
Dawson, Inc., 586 F.2d at l30295 ("[t]he content of a document, 
when considered with the circumstances surrounding its discovery, 
is an adequate basis for [its authenticationr).96 
2. Defendants' First Motion to Strike - Filed July 1, 2010 
In their first motion to strike, the Ada County Defendants failed to make specific 
objections and instead made a blanket objection "made pursuant to Rule 56(e), IRE 401, et seq., 
IRE 601 and 602, IRE 701, et seq., IRE 801, et seq., and IRE 901, et seq.,,97 A blanket 
evidentiary objection that a particular piece of evidence is inadmissible under the entire set of 
Idaho Rules of Evidence does not provide a sufficient basis for sustaining such an objection.98 
On this basis alone, the trial court could have denied the motion to strike. 
95 Full citation at Alexander Dawson v. NLRB, 586 F.2d l300 (9th Cir. 1978). 
96 Orr v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764, 778 Wh Cir. 2002). 
97 R. 914-15. 
98 FED. PRACT. & PROC., § 5036.7, ch. 2, Objections; Specificity-General Objections (current through 
2010) (general objection violates not only the letter of Rule 103 but its policy as well); see also 
McCormick On Evidence, Title 3, ch.6 § 52, Objections (current through 2009) (same); 75 Am. Jur.2d 
(TRIALS) § 333, General Objections-Objections to incompetency, irrelevant, and immaterial evidence 
(current through 2010) ("'a party objecting to evidence on the basis of lack of foundation must advise the 
court and the opposing party precisely what foundation is lacking"). 
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In addition, on August 13, 2010, Mrs. Hoagland filed the Affidavit of Darwin Overson in 
Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File a Third Amended Complaint, which cured many 
if not all of the Defendants' objections.99 Prior to the filing of the August 13, 2010 Affidavit, the 
trial court had granted Mrs. Hoagland's Rule 56(f) motion, and for that reason denied the 
Defendants' motion to strike.lOo Since the trial court was not ruling on the motion for summary 
judgment at that time, it makes sense that the trial court would include the language that it was 
not denying the motion as it pertained to inadmissible evidence. Doing so made it clear that the 
trial court was not foreclosing the Defendants from reasserting objections at a later time. 
However, the trial court never revisited the motion to strike after its January 20, 2011 Order 
because the Defendants filed a restated motion for summary judgment, 101 Mrs. Hoagland filed a 
different affidavit with exhibits attached thereto in opposition to the restated motion for summary 
judgment,102 and the Defendants filed a second motion to strike aimed at that affidavit. 103 
3. Defendants' Second Motion to Strike - Filed December 3, 2010 
In their second motion to strike, the Ada County Defendants repeated the same blanket 
objections as they had before, this time seeking "an Order striking portions of the Affidavit of 
Counsel in Support of Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendants' Restated Motion for Summary 
Judgment, pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 56( e) and 12( f)." 104 Their memorandum 
99 R. 1398-1408. 
100 Trans. (7/8/10) 94:5-95:6. 
101 R. 1668-69. 
102 R. 2073-79. 
103 R. 2246-47. 
104 R. 2246-47. 
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in support of the second motion to strike identified the grounds for their objections as being 
brought "pursuant to Rule 56(e), LR.C.P. as well as the applicable Idaho Rules of Evidence 
regarding Relevancy (LR.E. 401, et. seq.), Witness Competency (LR.E. 601 and 602), Opinions 
and Expert Testimony (LR.E. 701, et. seq.), Hearsay (LR.E. 801, et. seq.), and Authentication 
and Identification (LR.E. 901, et. seq.)." \05 
Defendants sought to strike Exhibits A-K, counsel's description of the contents of a 
video, and paragraph 10 of the aftIdavit. 106 The trial court granted Defendants' motion to strike 
part of Exhibit A, which was a report of the investigation by an Ada County Sheriff's detective 
into the death of Bradley.l07 The trial court also struck the portion of the affidavit where 
Mrs. Hoagland's counsel described the contents of the VICON video, and paragraph 10. 108 
(a) Exhibit A 
Exhibit A of the Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' 
Restated Motion for Summary Judgment was the deposition of Leslie Robertson. 109 Specifically, 
Defendants sought to strike a report of the Ada County Sheriff's Office detective who 
investigated Bradley's suicide, which was an exhibit to the deposition. I 10 The detective's report 
was used to question Ms. Robertson about her statements to the detective. III 
105 R. 2249. 
106 R. 2250-52. There is no appealable issue as to the description of the video or paragraph 10 since the 
trial court granted Defendants' motion to strike those parts of the affidavit. 
107 R. 2316-17. 
108 [d. No appeal issue exists as to the trial court's granting of the motion to strike the VICON video 
description. State v. Pickens, 148 Idaho 554, 557 (App. 2010). 
109 R. 2074. (Exhibits A-K to the affidavit are part of the appeal record as a CD). 
110 R. 2250. 
III R. 2074 Ex. A (Robertson Dep., 16:1-45:2, Ex. 0 (.pdfpp. 6-13, 52-79)). 
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The part of the report dealing with Ms. Robertson's interview is certainly admissible. 
She acknowledged that portion of the report as being a recounting of the interview she 
underwent with the detective. I 12 She confirmed as true most of the report relating to what she 
said to the detective, and made corrections and clarifications. II3 It would therefore be admissible 
under I.R.E. 803(5) as a recorded recollection, and under LR.E. 803(6) as a record of regularly 
conducted activity. 
The remaining portion of the report demonstrated what the document was, which satisfies 
any authenticity concerns under I.R.E. 901. 
The report would not be inadmissible hearsay since the Ada County Sheriff s detective 
conducted the investigation and wrote the report. As such, the report was a statement of a party 
opponent under LR.E. 804(b)(3). 
Foundation for the report also existed in the form of the same report having been 
produced by the Defendants in discovery that was verified by the Ada County Sheriff as being 
true, and thereafter filed with the trial court as an exhibit to counsel's affidavit. I 14 
In short, the detective's report was admissible evidence at the summary judgment stage. 
(b) Exhibits B-E 
The Ada County Defendants sought to strike exhibits B through E, G, and H through K of 
the affidavit on the grounds that 
"the bulk of the documents attached to these exhibits lacks proper 
foundation since Plaintiffs counsel cannot provide foundation for 
III R. 2074 Ex. A (Robertson Dep., 16:1-45:2, Ex. D (.pdfpp. 6-13, 52-79)). 
113 R. 2074 Ex. A (Robertson Dep., 16:1-45:2, Ex. D (.pdfpp. 6-13, 52-79)). 
114 R. 2074, Ex. E (.pdfpp. 381-95). 
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any document not authored by him or for which he is not the 
proper custodian. Further, Plaintiff's counsel cannot lay proper 
foundation for the Ada County Jail and Court Services Bureau 
Standard Operating Procedures." I 15 
Materials produced by an opposing party in discovery are admissible for summary judgment 
purposes where the producing party does not challenge authenticity.116 Here, the Defendants did 
not challenge the authenticity of any particular document, and even if they had, Ada County 
Sheriff Raney verified each of the discovery responses as being truthfully responsive to 
Mrs. Hoagland's discovery requests. 117 
The verified discovery production of the Ada County Sheriff satisfies any authentication 
issues under LR.E. 901-902. Many of the documents are clearly kept in the course of regular 
business by the jail. Affidavits were filed by employees of the Ada County Sheriff's Office 
further laying the foundation for all the jail records, including Bradley's medical records at the 
jail. ll8 Another Ada County Sheriff's employee signed an affidavit indicating that the Sheriff's 
Office is the custodian of the Boise City Police Departmenf s reports relating to Bradley which 
were attached as exhibits to the affidavit. 119 
115 R. 2250. 
116 LR.C.P. 33(b); Read v. Teton Springs Golf & Casting Club, LLC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134621,27-
28 (D. Idaho Dec. 14,2010); Edwards v. Alta Colleges, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3753, 16-18 (W.O. 
Tex. Feb. 28,2005); Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. New Images of Beverly Hills, 60 Fed. Appx. 87, 
*1 (9th Cir. 2003). 
117 R. 2074, Exs. B-E (.pdfpp. 99, 158,206,321). 
118 R. 148-50; HoaglandCONF.pdf(.pdfpp. 1-67,279-86). 
119 R. 148-50; HoaglandCONF.pdf(.pdfpp. 1-67,279-86). 
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It is not clear what other foundation the Ada County Defendants believe is necessary for 
the documents contained in Exhibits B-E, but the trial court certainly did not err by denying the 
Defendants' request that all the exhibits be stricken. 
(c) Exhibit F 
Defendants sought to strike all the exhibits to the deposition of Defendant Wroblewski on 
the grounds that a proper foundation was not laid. However, Exhibit A to his deposition was 
identified by the deponent as being his training record during his employment with the Ada 
County Sheriffs Office. 12o Exhibit B to the deposition was identified by the deponent as his 
own written statement created the day after Bradley's suicide. 121 Exhibit C to the deposition was 
identified as a blueprint of the jail that the deponent recognized as being accurate and was able to 
point out relevant areas of the jail on the document. 122 Exhibit D to the deposition was the sworn 
affidavit of the deponent. 123 A portion of Exhibit E of the deposition was identified by the 
deponent as being a copy of the record he created on the Ada County Sheriffs Office computer 
when he booked Bradley into the jail; and the remainder are Ada County Sheriff s Office records 
produced in discovery as can be determined by comparing them with the other documents 
attached to the affidavit of counsel. 124 Exhibit F to the deposition was identified by the deponent 
as being the Inmate Housing Security Log that he reviewed and made an entry on just before he 
120 R. 2075 Ex. F (Wroblewski Dep. 12:2-16:12 (.pdfpp. 576-77, 597)). 
121 R. 2075 Ex. F (Wroblewski Dep. 17:4-23:21 (.pdfpp. 577-79, 598-99)). 
122 R. 2075 Ex. F (Wroblewski Dep. 23:22-40:14 (.pdfpp. 579-83, 600-01)). 
123 R. 2075 Ex. F (Wroblewski Dep. 40:15-43:15 (.pdfpp. 583-84, 602-05)). 
124 R. 2075 Ex. F (Wroblewski Dep. 43:16-47:13 (.pdfpp. 584-85, 606-20)). 
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removed Bradley from the holding cell. l25 Exhibit G to the deposition was identified by the 
deponent as a copy of the VICON video he downloaded from the jail's computerized records 
system and reviewed when he wrote the document identified as Exhibit B to the deposition. 126 
The deponent testified that he was present for the events depicted on the video. 127 Exhibits H 
through K of the deposition were identified by the deponent as operating procedures of the Ada 
County Jail. 128 Exhibit L of the deposition is simply a copy of Exhibit F to the deposition with 
additional booking records from the Ada County Jail. 129 
All of the exhibits to Wroblewski's deposition were admissible. 
4. Defendants' Third Motion to Strike - Filed February 25, 2011 
On February 7, 2011, Mrs. Hoagland filed a motion to reconsider the trial court's 
January 20, 2011 Memorandum Decision and Order of Clarification. 130 In support of 
Mrs. Hoagland's motion for reconsideration, she filed an affidavit of her counsel, with exhibits, 
and also filed an affidavit of her expert, Dr. White. 131 
On February 25, 2011, the Ada County Defendants filed their third motion to strike, 
seeking to strike paragraph 13 of counsel's affidavit consisting of copies of some of the 
deposition exhibits; and paragraph 14 of counsel's affidavit consisting of a statement that, as the 
125 R. 2075 Ex. F (Wroblewski Dep. 47:14-67:3 (.pdfpp. 585-90, 621-22)). 
126 R. 2075 Ex. F (Wroblewski Dep. 67:4-75:16 (.pdf pp. 590-92, 623)). The DVD is located in the 
appellate record at Pltfs Mtn for Reconsideration-Aff. of Counsel Exhibits II-IS/Exhibit 15. 
127 R. 2075 Ex. F (Wroblewski Dep. 67:4-75:16 (.pdfpp. 590-92)). 
128 R. 2075 Ex. F (Wroblewski Dep. 75:16-83:24 (.pdfpp. 592-94, 624-49)). 
129 R. 2075 Ex. F (Wroblewski Dep. 83:25-90: 17 (.pdfpp. 594-96, 650-56)). 
130 R. 2360-62. 
131 R. 2625-2990, 3012-30; Pltfs Mtn for Reconsideration - Aff. of Counsel Exhibits 11-15. 
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depositions were taken, the court reporter maintained all the exhibits in a binder which were then 
attached to the affidavit. 132 Defendants did not identify which of the exhibits contained m 
paragraph 13 of the affidavit they sought to strike, other than to say the following: 
A number of exhibits were marked and referred to during the 
Plaintiff's depositions. However, some of the exhibits were 
referred to during the depositions, while others were not. 
Oftentimes the deponent was not asked proper foundational 
questions for the exhibit, and other times the deponent was not the 
proper witness to lay foundation for the exhibit. 133 
Defendants made a general objection and cited to I.R.E. 401, et. seq.; 601, et. seq.; 701, et. seq.; 
801, et. seq.; and 901, et. seq.134 
Defendants also sought to strike the affidavit of Dr. White on the grounds of timeliness, 
and alternatively Defendants claimed the supplemental report was insufficient, redundant, and 
"in Part Misleading." 135 
The trial court granted Defendants' third motion to strike as it pertained to audio 
recordings of telephone calls made as part of the investigation into Bradley's death by the Ada 
County Sheriff's detective. 136 The trial court actually erred by striking the audio recordings 
since they were part of the detective's report which was included in an affidavit filed on 
November 26, 2010. 137 The recordings were submitted to the trial court, and they are readily 
132 R. 3250-62. 
133 R. 3253. 
134 R. 3254. 
135 R. 3254-60. 
136 R. 3489-90. 
137 R. 2073-74 Ex. E (Overson Aff., ~ 6 (.pdfpp. 381-95)). 
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identifiable upon listening to them as telephone calls made from the jail by Bradley on a 
. 1 d d . I . 138 Th . h If h . . 139 particu ar ate an at a particu ar tIme. at IS, t ey were se -aut entlcatmg. 
Ada County Defendants also cross-appeal the trial court's denial of their third motion to 
strike part of Dr. White's expert opinion. Defendants' primary complaint on appeal is that the 
trial court allowed the supplementation of Dr. White's report. As the trial court noted, 
Defendants argued that they were prejudiced by what they described as the untimely 
supplemental report, but they did not file a motion to continue under LR.C.P. S6(f) to permit 
them additional time to retake his deposition. 140 
Despite Defendants' complaints, they were not prejudiced by the supplementation of 
Dr. White's report. Dr. White's original report was submitted on October 11, 2010. 141 
Defendants took his deposition on November 18, 2010. 142 Numerous depositions were taken 
after his deposition and Defendants produced a significant number of documents that Dr. White 
did not have access to prior to his deposition.143 After reviewing the additional depositions and 
discovery materials, he supplemented his report on February 3, 2011, and it was filed as an 
attachment to his affidavit on February 11,2011. 144 
138 R. 2313-14. Audio is on a CD as Phone Calls Originating from Ada County Jail. 
139 The citations in Appellant's brief are to the detective's report that was submitted to the trial court as an 
exhibit to Robertson's deposition and as part of Defendants' verified discovery responses. Appellant's 
Brief, pp. 31 n. 131,47-48 n. 207. The detective's report describes how he obtained the telephone calls 
and confirmed the identification of those speaking and included a description of the contents of the call. 
[d. 
140 R. 3491. 
141 R. 2121, 2124, 2149, 3491-92. 
142 R. 2121, 3491-92. 
143 Compare R. 2135 with 3027,3491-92. 
144 R. 3012-13, 3016-27, 3491-92. 
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The Ada County Defendants have provided next to no analysis on appeal that would 
explain why Dr. White should not have been allowed to supplement his report. Perhaps it is 
because, in Idaho, it is recognized that expert opinions will frequently evolve as factual 
discovery proceeds and more is learned about the case. 145 
Defendants seem to argue that Dr. White's disclosures were not seasonably 
supplemented. However, whether a party has seasonably supplemented a discovery response is 
left to the discretion of the Court, as the term is not very precise. In Edmunds, however, the trial 
court did provide the following guidance: 
This Court has not yet announced a more precise definition of 
"seasonably." However, as Justice Bakes noted in Hopkins: "an 
important inquiry in determining whether a response was given 
• seasonably' is: was the opposing party given an opportunity for 
full cross examination? If 'yes,' then there probably would be no 
abuse of discretion in admitting the testimony." St. Alphonsus was 
afforded a full opportunity not only to cross-examine 
Dr. Hollander as to these newly expressed opinions because the 
supplementation was eight months prior to trial, but also to 
undertake additional discovery at no or very little additional cost as 
they had not yet deposed Dr. Hollander. Therefore, the 
supplementation of Dr. Hollander's opinion was seasonable. 146 
The case at hand is not like the situation in Clark v. Klein, where the trial court erred by 
letting the expert testifY at trial even though the expert's identity and substance of anticipated 
testimony were requested but not provided "until after the trial had begun.,,147 Nor is it like 
145 Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 873-75 (2006); Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho 161, 164-66 (2007); 
Hopkins v. Duo-Fast Corp., 123 Idaho 205, 213 (1993) (Bakes, C.J. concurring) (citing Radmer v. Ford 
Motor Co., 120 Idaho 86,813 P.2d 897 (1991)); Clarkv. Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 156-58 (2002). 
146 142 Idaho 867,875 (Idaho 2006) (internal citations omitted). 
147 Clark v. Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 156-58 (2002) (emphasis added). 
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Radmer v. Ford Motor Co., where the plaintiff similarly failed to supplement its response to the 
defendant's discovery request seeking the identity of experts and the substance of their testimony 
"until the first day of the trial, after the jury had been empanelled.,,148 In both cases, the Idaho 
Supreme Court ruled that it was error to admit the experts' testimony because of prejudice to the 
defendants' ability to prepare for cross examination. 149 Here, the Ada County Defendants were 
not prejudiced. As the trial court noted, they were free to move for a continuance to take the 
deposition of Dr. White to ask him questions about his supplemental report. 
By comparison to the situations in Clark and Radmer, in Hopkins v. Duo-Fast Corp., the 
trial court admitted expert testimony where the defendant did not disclose the expert's new 
theory of how the accident happened until just before he took the stand at trial. 150 However, 
instead of reversing, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision to allow the 
testimony because the defendant had not learned of the expert's recent testing until the night just 
prior to the expert taking the stand. 151 The Court held that the trial court made its decision within 
the bounds of discretion based on the fact that it did not appear to be a situation where the 
defendant had engaged in "sandbagging.,,152 
Here, there is no basis for believing that Mrs. Hoagland was "sandbagging" by delaying 
the supplemental report. As already stated, significant discovery took place between Dr. White's 
deposition and his supplemental report. 
148 120 Idaho 86, 90 (1991) (emphasis added). 
149 Clark, 137 Idaho at 156-58; Radmer, 120 Idaho at 90. 
150 123 Idaho 205, 206-212 (1993). 
15IId. 
152Id. 
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The trial court did not abuse its discretion or otherwise err when it denied in part the Ada 
County Defendants' motion to strike. 
S. Defendants' Fourth Motion to Strike - Filed March 4, 2011 
On March 11, 2011, the Ada County Defendants filed their fourth motion to strike, this 
time seeking to strike portions of Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion 
for Reconsideration. 153 The stated basis for their motion was that the 
Plaintiff makes unsupported factual and diagnostic assertions that 
have no evidentiary basis. ... Defendants also bring this Motion 
in response to Plaintiff s mischaracterization of certain deposition 
testimony, fearing that characterization may inaccurately depict the 
actual testimony on record. 154 
On appeal, the Ada County Defendants argue the issue of whether the trial court should have 
considered what Defendants claimed was Mrs. Hoagland's "mischaracterization of Deputy 
Wroblewski's interaction with Munroe.,,155 
Defendants provided several examples of the alleged "mischaracterizations" of the 
testimony of Wroblewski: First, whether Wroblewski observed that Bradley was intoxicated 
during the time he booked Bradley into the jail on the morning of September 29, 2008. 156 Citing 
Wroblewski's deposition testimony that Bradley appeared hung over but not drunk, Defendants 
153 R. 3315-16. 
154 R. 3317-18. 
155 Cross-Appeal Brief, p. 35. 
156 R. 3322. 
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discount the fact that Wroblewski documented at the time his impression that Bradley was 
intoxicated and smelled of alcohol. 157 
The second example given by Defendants was that Mrs. Hoagland had mischaracterized 
Wroblewski's testimony concerning whether Bradley had told him he was considering suicide at 
the time. 158 Citing Wroblewski's deposition testimony that Bradley followed up his statement 
regarding contemplating suicide by saying that he had been thinking about it "but not now," 
Defendants discount the fact that Wroblewski never documented the "but not now" statement, 
that Wroblewski answered the question of whether Bradley appeared suicidal in the affirmative, 
and that Wroblewski used the present tense when he noted that Bradley was seeing shadow 
people and hearing voices. 159 
The third example given by Defendants was that Mrs. Hoagland had mischaracterized 
Wroblewski's deposition testimony stating that Bradley stated to Wroblewski that he was 
hearing voices in his head and seeing shadow people. 160 Again, Defendants discount that 
Wroblewski recorded Bradley's statement using the present tense and that Wroblewski 
documented that Bradley appeared to him to be at risk for suicide. 161 
While the Defendants complain that Mrs. Hoagland unfairly presented Wroblewski's 
testimony by leaving out important parts of the testimony,162 the trial court had before it the 
157 See R. 2074 Ex. F (Wroblewski Dep., 51:7-52:25, 59:2-60:23, 82:1-2, Ex. E (.pdfpp. 586-594)). 
158 R. 3322-23. 
159 See R. 2074 Ex. F (Wroblewski Dep., 60:24-65:6, 75:19-82:2, Exs. E, K (.pdfpp. 586-594)). 
160 R. 3323. 
161 See R. (Wroblewski Dep., 51:7-52:25, 59:2-65:6, 75:19-82:2, Exs. E, K (.pdfpp. 586-594)). 
162 Cross-Appeal Brief, p. 36. 
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entire transcript of Wroblewski's deposition.1 63 Nothing was hidden from the trial court. 
Primarily, the Defendants' complaint is that they are not willing to accept that the standard on 
summary judgment requires that the record be viewed in a light most favorable to the non-
moving party. 
Furthermore, a motion to strike is the wrong procedure to challenge whether the opposing 
party is presenting facts inaccurately. The proper procedure at the summary judgment stage and 
at trial is to present the evidence that proves the facts are other than what the opposing party 
claims. 
The trial court found that the motion was too amorphous to rule on since the Ada County 
Defendants had provided examples but that that was all they were. 164 On that basis, it was within 
the trial court's discretion to deny the motion. The trial court did not err by denying the motion, 
and this Court should not overturn the trial court's ruling. 
E. The Trial Court Incorrectly Viewed Mrs. Hoagland's Survivorship Claim as Being 
Brought by the Estate When, In Fact, It Was Brought by Mrs. Hoagland as an Heir, 
Which Gave Her Standing Under Idaho's Probate Code 
The Ada County Defendants frame Count I as having been brought by the Estate. The 
trial court incorrectly dismissed Count I on the grounds that "Idaho law does not allow Munroe's 
estate to bring a claim." 165 Count I was brought by Mrs. Hoagland as an heir of Bradley's estate 
and in her capacity as the personal representative of the estate. 166 
163 See R. (Wroblewski Dep., 1:1-90:23, Exs. A-L). 
164 R. 3493. 
165 See R. 1542-1553, 1584. 
166 R. 1451-52, 1505. 
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F. The Law Was Sufficiently Established At the Time to Put the Ada County 
Defendants on Notice That Their Conduct Was In Violation of Bradley's 
Constitutional Rights 
The Ada County Defendants argue that the law was not sufficiently established to put 
Johnson and Wroblewski on notice that their conduct was in violation of Bradley's constitutional 
rights, and they are, therefore, entitled to qualified immunity. In support of their argument, 
Defendants cite four cases where the plaintiffs claims were dismissed. However, three of the 
cases cited are distinguishable, and one is poorly reasoned and wrongly decided. Given the 
abundance of case law in this area of the law, it is difficult to fathom that a jail employee who is 
aware that an inmate faces a significant risk of suicide would not be on notice that the 
Constitution requires reasonable action to abate that risk. 
Defendants rely on Rhyne v. Henderson, which is misplaced since the plaintiff in that 
case sued only the county and none of the individual officers involved. 167 The court was 
therefore was not called upon to determine whether any of the officers' conduct violated the 
detainee's constitutional rights. It was only called upon to determine the county's liability, 
which it determined was not supported by the evidence presented at trial. 168 
Defendants' reliance on Minix v. Canarecci is similarly misplaced. 169 There, the 
undisputed facts were that a mental health evaluation was conducted by an employee who had no 
knowledge of the detainee's history of suicidality and did not know that he was on suicide 
167 Rhyne v. Henderson County, 973 F.2d 386,392 (5th Cir. Tex. 1992) ("Rhyne, however, cannot prevail 
by showing that the jail staff failed to provide reasonable medical care. The suit is against Henderson 
County"). 
168 !d. at 392-95. 
169 597 F.3d 824,828 (7th Cir. 2010). 
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watch. l7O Here, both Johnson and Wroblewski were aware of Bradley's mental health, suicidal 
history, and his status on suicide watch. The detainee in Minix was later placed on suicide 
watch, and after several days of being alert and positive, the jail's nurse removed him from 
suicide watch. 171 The detainee displayed no "strange behavior" that would have raised a 
suspicion that he might harm himself. I72 In the case at hand, Bradley had displayed a number of 
behaviors that, along with his history, should have raised suspicions that he was at risk for self-
harm. As Mrs. Hoagland's experts testified, Johnson's deviation from accepted standards was 
extreme, whereas in Minix the experts testified that the nurse merely used poor judgment. 173 
Deliberate indifference can be shown even though a defendant physician has not entirely ignored 
the plaintiffs condition if the prescribed treatment "is such a substantial departure from accepted 
professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible did 
not base the decision on such a judgment." 174 Such was the case here. 
Defendants also cite to Perez v. Oakland County, where the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that an inmate case worker was entitled to qualified immunity on the grounds that a 
reasonable caseworker under the circumstances would not know the actions taken were in 
violation of the Constitution. 175 However, that holding is at odds with the court's first finding, 
which was that a genuine issue of material fact existed on the question of whether the caseworker 
170 Id. at 831-832. 
171 !d. at 833. 
172 !d. 
173 !d. 
174 Youngbergv. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982); Estate o/Cole by Pardue v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254, 262 
(ih Cir. 1996). 
175 466 F.3d 416, 428 (6th Cir. Mich. 2006). 
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knew of the serious risk of suicide faced by the inmate and took no action to abate that risk. 176 
Irrespective of specifics of a given case, it has long been the law that if an official knows of a 
serious medical risk and ignores it, that official violates the Constitution.177 This Court should 
not follow Perez as it is neither consistent with the majority of cases in this area of the law nor 
with logic. 
Also cited by Defendants is Simmons v. Navajo County, which is distinguishable from the 
case at hand by the fact that the defendants had taken reasonable measures to protect the detainee 
from suicide. 178 Having a month prior attempted to cut his wrists, the juvenile detainee was 
placed on Level I suicide watch. 179 He received daily evaluations and appropriate medication for 
his depression. 180 After concluding that he had improved, the social worker moved the detainee 
to a Level II suicide watch. 181 He committed suicide while on suicide watch, and there was 
nothing to indicate to the staff that the detainee was at such a great risk of suicide that returning 
him to Level I status was justified or required. 182 
A case not cited by Defendants is Cavalieri v. Shepard, where a police officer was denied 
qualified immunity under circumstances similar to those in this case. 183 There, a detainee 
arrested for kidnapping and threatening the life of a former girlfriend had made statements that 
176Id. at 424-426. 
177 Cavalieri, 321 F.3d 616, 618-20 (ih Cir. 2003). 
178 609 F.3d 1011, 1018-1019 (9th Cir. Ariz. 2010). 
179 !d. at 1014-16. 
180 !d. 
181Id. 
182 Id. 
183 321 F.3d 616,618-20 (ih Cir. 2003). 
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he would take his life if he went to jail. 184 The detainee's girlfriend informed the officer that 
during the kidnapping the detainee had threatened suicide. 185 The detainee's mother told the 
officer that her son's mental condition was fragile and that he needed to see a counselor, and that 
her son had been on suicide watch during the prior month while being held on other charges. 186 
She also told the officer she believed her son needed to be on suicide watch. 187 When the officer 
spoke with the detainee, the detainee "was looking forward to seeing his mother. . .. that Steven 
seemed calm when they spoke on the phone, was without weapons, and that during their phone 
conversation he stated he was doing fine.,,188 After finding that a constitutional violation had 
occurred, the court then found that the law was sufficiently established to put the officer on 
notice that his conduct was a violation of the Constitution: 
We conclude that the law as it existed at the time of Steven's 
suicide attempt provided Shepard with fair notice that his conduct 
was unconstitutional. The rule that officials, including police 
officers, will be "liable under section 1983 for a pre-trial detainee's 
suicide if they were deliberately indifferent to a substantial suicide 
risk," ... , was clearly established prior to 1998. 189 
Like the officer in Cavalieri, Johnson argues that a case must exist that is on all fours with the 
facts of this case for him to be on notice that it would violate a detainee's constitutional rights for 
him to be deliberately indifferent to a serious risk of suicide. In the face ofthe developed law as 
it existed in 2008 when Bradley committed suicide, that argument is without merit. 
184 Id. 
185 !d. 
186Id. 
187 !d. 
188 !d. at 619. 
189 !d. at 623 (citing Hope, 122 S. Ct. at 2516). 
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The cases cited by the Ada County Defendants do not assist Johnson in this case where a 
genuine issue of material fact exists as to Johnson's knowledge of the risk of suicide faced by 
Bradley. Nor do they assist Wroblewski, since a similar factual issue for the jury exists as to his 
state of mind at the time he documented that Bradley appeared to be at risk of suicide. 
Mrs. Hoagland does not have to cite to a case that is identical in every detail in order to 
overcome these Defendants' claims to qualified immunity. The law has been clear for a very 
long time that if an official knows that an inmate is at risk for suicide, the Constitution requires 
that the official take reasonable steps to protect the inmate from self-harm. 
Woodward v. Myers is another jail suicide case similar to the one at hand where a federal 
district court denied the defendant's claim to qualified immunity.190 There, a pretrial detainee 
underwent an intake suicide evaluation by a jail nurse shortly after being taken to jail on 
September 24, 1998. 191 In completing the evaluation, the nurse marked "yes" to the question of 
whether the inmate "expresses thoughts of killing self."192 Despite directions on the form and 
the jail's policy requiring the nurse to notify the shift commander when that question was 
answered in the affirmative, the nurse did not inform the shift commander. 193 On October 13, 
190 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23413 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 5, 2002), affirmed sub nom. Woodward v. eMS, 368 
F.3d 917 (7th Cir. 2004) Gury may rely on the contents of a contemporaneously made document versus the 
"after-the-fact" explanation provided by a defendant seeking to explain the document); see also 
Woodward v. Myers I, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6245 (N.D. Ill. May 14,2001) (trial court's ruling on the 
defendants' first motion for summary judgment). 
191 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23413 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 5, 2002). 
192 Id. 
193Id. 
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1998, the inmate hung himself to death in a single occupant lockdown cell where he had been 
. d 194 asslgne . 
The nurse moved for summary judgment claiming that when she marked "yes" on the 
form, she was merely documenting that the inmate had been suicidal in the past. 195 The court 
rejected the nurse's argument, finding instead that a reasonable jury could conclude that the 
nurse understood that the inmate was suicidal at the time of the evaluation since the form posed 
the question in the present tense and the nurse made no effort to modify the response to indicate 
it referred to past events. 196 
In this sense, the nurse's claim in Woodward is similar to that being argued by 
Wroblewski, who documented a "yes" response to a number of the suicide questions, including 
the final question that asks whether the inmate appears to be at risk for suicide. Only after 
learning that Bradley had committed suicide did Wroblewski document that Bradley had said he 
had been suicidal in the past "but not now." However, like the nurse in Woodward, Wroblewski 
did not attempt to modify his affirmative answers to the suicide questions, as he had done to 
other questions on the form. Also like the nurse in Woodward, Wroblewski was fully aware that 
the jail's policies required that he notify the medical unit when the suicide questions are 
answered in the affirmative, and yet he took no such action. 
The nurse in Woodward, like Johnson in this case, also attempted to avoid liability by 
characterizing her decision not to inform the shift commander as a "treatment decision" that 
194 Id. 
195Id. 
196Id. 
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would more appropriately be the basis of a medical malpractice claim. 197 The court found that 
argument unpersuasive because the subjective element of deliberate indifference may be inferred 
from the treatment decisions when the decisions are "such a substantial departure from accepted 
professional judgment, practice or standards as to demonstrate the person did not base the 
decision on such a judgment.,,198 As in Woodward, Mrs. Hoagland's experts testified that 
Johnson's conduct fell far outside the accepted standards. As such, a reasonable jury could infer 
from Johnson's conduct that he was subjectively aware of the risk Bradley faced and took no 
reasonable action to protect Bradley despite that knowledge. 
G. Kate Pape Was On Notice That By Not Enforcing Policies Designed to Ensure 
Mental Healthcare Delivery to Inmates, a Constitutional Violation Was Likely to 
Occur 
Pape made the conscious decision to operate the medical unit on an ad hoc basis, contrary 
to written jail policy. "For all intents and purposes, ignoring a policy is the same as having no 
policy in place in the first place.,,199 "Jail managers who decided to take no precautions against 
the possibility of inmate suicide-to have no policy, for example no suicide watch option-would 
be guilty of deliberate indifference in the relevant sense.,,200 Pape's conscious decision to 
operate the jail's medical unit outside of the bounds of Ada County Jail policy was deliberate 
indifference toward the constitutional rights the written policies were in place to protect.201 
197Id. 
198 !d. 
199 Woodward, 368 F.3d at 929. 
200 Boncher v. Brown Cty., 272 F.3d 484, 489 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoted in Woodward v. eMS, 368 F.3d 917 
(ih 2004)). 
201 R. 3016-27. 
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H. Mrs. Hoagland's Monell Claim Should Not Have Been Dismissed 
Mrs. Hoagland's claim is similar in many respects to the Monell claim made in 
Woodward v. CMS.202 There, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a jury verdict against 
a private jail facility.203 The facility argued on appeal that because there had been no prior 
suicide deaths until the one which was the subject of the case, the plaintiffs had not shown a 
pattern that would sustain the verdict. 204 The court rejected that argument because the evidence 
demonstrated that the facility was operated contrary to its own written policies and the deviation 
from the written policies was causal of the inmate's suicide.205 The court observed that, 
The Supreme Court has expressly acknowledged that evidence of a 
single violation of federal rights can trigger municipal liability if 
the violation was a "highly predictable consequence" of the 
municipality's failure to act.206 
Here, the disregard for written policy and violations of the same were a moving force in 
Bradley's death.207 A jury could reasonably find that, had the policies been enforced, Bradley 
would have received a suicide evaluation that was on par with the standards in the social work 
field. Had policy been enforced, Bradley would not have been removed from suicide watch and 
he would not have been assigned to a cell where he was alone with a bunk bed and sheets, at the 
end of a hall where he was obscured from the view of other inmates and the jail staff. Like in 
Woodward v. ClVfS, the deliberate indifference to Bradley's safety was demonstrated by the Ada 
202 Woodward v. CMS, 368 F.3d 917,929 (7th Cir. 2004). 
203Id. 
204 Id. 
205Id. 
206Id. (quoting Bd. o/Cty. Comm'rs a/Bryan Cly. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,409 (1997)). 
207 R. 3016-27. 
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County Jail's condoning of its employees not following policies?08 As such, the trial court erred 
when it dismissed Mrs. Hoagland's Monell claim. 
I. Costs and Fees 
Should Mrs. Hoagland prevail on the issues raised in the cross-appeal, she should be 
awarded attorney fees and costs on her appeal pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-107 and 12-121, 
and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41. The § 1983 claims brought by Mrs. Hoagland expressly 
allow for recovery of costs and fees to a prevailing § 1983 plaintiff?09 Should the Ada County 
Defendants prevail on appeal, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 does not provide for attorney fees absent a 
finding that the case was pursued frivolously. 210 
II. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons herein stated, this Court should reverse the trial court's dismissal of all of 
Mrs. Hoagland's claims and award fees and costs to her on appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of April, 2012. 
JONES & SWARTZ PLLC 
DARWIN L. OVERSON 
208 See Id. 
209 See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b); Miller v. Ririe Joint Sch. Dist. No. 252, 132 Idaho 385, 387 (1999) ("A party 
who prevails on a civil rights claim under § 1983 is entitled to seek recovery of attorney fees under 
§ 1988.") (citations omitted); McCown v. City of Fontana, 565 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009) ("Under 
42 U.S.C. § 1988, a court may award the prevailing party in a § 1983 claim 'a reasonable attorney's fee as 
part of the costs.''') 
210 Christiansburg Garment Co. v. E.E.o.C., 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14 
(1980). 
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